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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Re-Defining the Role of the Canadian Judiciary
in Bankruptcies and Receiverships
Stephanie Ben-lshai*
1.

INTRODUCTION

Consistent with prevailing neo-liberal ideologies, the Canadian
bankruptcy system has become increasingly privatized. Parties have
been left to bargain in the shadow of the law to determine which businesses will be rehabilitated, and how best lo deal with those businesses'
financial difficulties. The Canadian judiciary facilitates the process, but
it is largely the debtor corporation and its major creditors that drive it.
Situated in this context, this commentary considers the broader issue of
how contracts entered into by a debtor corporation prior to bankruptcy
will be treated on the bankruptcy of the debtor corporation. It focuses in
particular on successor employer liability issues. The treatment of employees in bankruptcy brings into focus the potential inequities that can
surface when the rights of third parties can be negotiated away without
their consent, in what is, in practice at least, an increasingly privatized
bankruptcy process.
A significant group of stakeholders in any corporate bankruptcy is
the debtor corporation's employees. Employees' wages and benefits arc
negotiated in their employment contracts and collective agreements.
Once wages and benefits have been agreed upon, employees are generally not in a position to alter the agreed upon wages and benefits-in

particular, when the financial situation of their employer changes. Employees usually do not know if their employer is likely to go bankrupt
and arc generally not in a position to demand risk premiums. Accordingly, certain provisions are in place in Canadian labour legislation and
in bankruptcy legislation to protect employees. The protection provided
by these provisions is threatened when a receiver is put into place to
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realize the assets of the employer corporation. In an effort to realize on
such assets, a receiver may continue the employer's operations with a
view to selling the corporation as a going concern and may continue to
employ the dchtor corporation's employees. However, a common practice has developed in Canada, where receivers, who are increasingly
court appointed and derive their authority and powers from a court
order, 1 attend on a hankruptcy judge ex parte with a draft order agreed
upon by the debtor corporation and the major creditors. The draft order
gives the receiver extensive powers, and at the same time limits the
nature of the receiver's liahility to employees and unions, even if they
do continue to operate the former employer's husiness. 2
The recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision in GMAC Commercial
Credit Corp. v. TCT Logistics lnc. 1 ("TCT') signifies a shift hy Canadian
courts in the direction of a principled framework for grappling with the
relationship hetween the roles and jurisdiction of private parties, receivers, trustees, hankruptcy judges, and provincial labour hoards in dealing
with employees' rights when a corporation is in financial trouble. The
Ontario Court of Appeal in TCT considered: ( 1) whether the bankruptcy
court4 has the authority to effectively immunize a receiver or a trustee
'

Sec Peter P. Farkas, "Why Are There So Many Court-Appointed Receiverships'?"
(2003) 20 Nat'l Insolv. Rev. 37. Over the last decade the receivership landscape has
changed significantly from a situation where the majority of receiverships were
private appointments, usually initiated by Canadian banks, to the current situation
where the majority arc court appointed.
Other provisions that arc generally provided for in a receivership order include:
authorization for the receiver to take possession of the debtor's assets and to carry on
its business: authorization to market and sell a debtor's business and/or assets subject
to court approval: authorization to conduct an investigation into the debtor's financial
affairs: a requirement that all books, records and information related to a debtor's
affairs he delivered to the receiver, upon such request: provisions that deem the
receiver not to have liability for a debtor's existing environmental problems: provisions that "stay" third parties from interfering with the debtor's business, including
terminating agreements and cutting off utilities: authorization to borrow funds to
allow the business to operate during the receivership period: and limitations on a
receiver's liability, except in the case of gross negligence and willful misconduct.
Ibid., at 3.
' (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 1284, 2004 C.L.L.C. 220-029, 185 0.A.C. 138, 48 C.B.R.
(4th) 256, 40 C.C.P.B. 45, 238 D.L.R. (4th) 677 (Ont. C.A.).
4
Unlike the American context, in Canada there is no actual "bankruptcy court" or
"bankruptcy judge." See lain Ramsay, "Interest Groups and the Politics of Consumer
Bankruptcy Reform in Canada" (2003) 53 U.T.L.J. 379 at 393, 399. All Superior
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in bankruptcy appointed under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act5
("BIA") from the obligations of a successor employer where that practitioner operates the debtor's business in nrder to sell it as a going
concern; and (2) the test to be applied by the bankruptcy court for
granting a union leave to bring successor employer proceedings before
the Ontario Labour Relations Board ("OLRB").
The majority reasons in TCT, written by Feldman J.A., with Cronk
J.A. concurring, reached two significant conclusions. First, the bankruptcy cou11 does not have the authority to determine whether a receiver
or trustee carries on the business of a debtor as a successor employer,
rather the OLRB has exclusive jurisdiction to make this determination.
Second, the bankruptcy court, in its exercise of supervisory control, can
deny leave to bring successor employer proceedings against a trustee or
receiver before the OLRB based on factors relevant to the bankruptcy
and the best interests of all stakeholders.
On the basis of these two conclusions, the majority remitted the
matter back to the bankruptcy court, which had previously denied the
appellant union leave to commence successor employer proceedings
before the OLRB. The bankruptcy court was directed to determine
whether to grant leave on the basis of the test articulated by the majority.
The third member of the panel in TCT, Mac Pherson J .A., dissented
on the second conclusion reached by the majority, as he would have
granted the appellant leave to commence proceedings before the OLRB.

2.

FACTS

The TCT proceedings arose out of three OLRB applications filed
by the Industrial Wood and Allied Workers of Canada, Local 700 (the
"Union") without leave of the bankruptcy court that was overseeing the
interim receivership of TCT Logistics Inc. and related companies (collectively "TCT"). The Union was the exclusive bargaining agent for the

'

Court judges in the provinces and territories have jurisdiction in bankruptcy. Certain
Superior Court judges handle a larger number of bankruptcies and have developed a
specialization in commercial bankruptcy. For the purposes of this article, the terms
bankruptcy court and bankruptcy judge arc used in the same manner as in the TCT
reasons.
R.S.C. 1985. c. B-3.
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70 employees at one of the warehousing facilities located on Horner
A venue operated by TCT.
TCT became insolvent in January 2002, and moved under s. 47 of
the BIA and s. 10 I of the Courts <~(Justice Ac{' for an order appointing
KPMG Inc. as interim receiver over the assets of TCT. The order granting interim receivership powers subject to court supervision was granted
on January 24, 2002 (the "Order"). Among other standard provisions,
the Order provided that KPMG Inc. would shut down and sell TCT's
businesses and assign TCT into bankruptcy. The Order also provided
that KPMG Inc. was empowered to engage, retain, discharge, or terminate employees of TCT, hut any such actions would not establish it as a
successor employer under the Ontario Labour Relations Act, 19957
("LRA") or any other provincial or federal statutes. Further, no actions
or proceedings could he commenced against KPMG Inc. in any court or
other tribunal without leave of the bankruptcy court.
Following its appointment as interim receiver, KPMG Inc. entered
into an asset purchase agreement with Spectrum Supply Chain Solutions
("Spectrum")-a corporation formed by the former management of
TCT. Spectrum set up operations in a Toronto neighborhood that was
located in close proximity to TCT's Horner Avenue warehouse, with
essentially the same customer base. As part of the asset purchase agreement, where Spectrum purchased TCT's assets with the exception of
two warehouses, KPMG Inc. retained Spectrum to manage the wind
down of the two warehouses. One of these was the Horner A venue
warehouse that gave rise to this appeal. KPMG Inc. terminated all unionized employees at the Horner A venue warehouse, although some
were later rehired by Spectrum to work at the new Spectrum warehouse,
without regard to Union seniority.
The Union alleged in its applications to the OLRB that Spectrum
was incorporated for the sole purpose of acquiring TCT's warehousing
assets and that the purpose of the asset purchase agreement between
Spectrum and KPMG Inc. was to oust the Union and to operate TCT's
warehousing business in Toronto under substantially the same management hut without a union.
'' R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.
7
S.O. 1995. c. I, Schcd. A.
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COURT OF APPEAL DECISION

(a)

BIA Receivership Orders Are Not Immune to OLRB
Scrutiny

(i)

Majority Reasons

The three members of the Court of Appeal panel in TCT all agreed
that ss. 69( 12) and 114( 1) of the LRA give the OLRB the unequivocal
and exclusive jurisdiction to decide the successor employer issue for
labour relations purposes in every case. Accordingly, the standard practice of inserting clauses in receivership orders that exclude successor
employer liability cannot serve to immunize receivers' actions from
review by the OLRB. The Court reached this conclusion after reviewing
ss. 47(2) and 14.06(1.2) of the BIA. These provisions, read together,
give the bankruptcy court the power to direct the receiver to carry on
the business of the debtor and at the same time provide that the receiver
will not be liable for any obligations incurred by the debtor corporation
before the date of bankruptcy. However, the BIA provisions are silent
on any obligations that the receiver may incur following his or her
appointment, which may include successor employer liability under the
LRA. Accordingly, s. 72 of the BIA, which provides that the BIA will
only abrogate or supcrcede provincial law if the law is in conflict with
the BIA, is not applicable. That is, the language of the BIA provisions
docs not conflict with the successor employer provisions in the LRA
and accordingly docs not abrogate or supercede them.

(ii)

Commentary

The Court of Appeal's reluctance to allow receivership orders
drafted by the parties and "rubber stamped" by the bankruptcy court to
interfere with the mandatory nature of successor employer liability without the scrutiny of the OLRB is justified given the greater potential for
information asymmetry. The purpose of the successor employer provisions in the LRA is to accord protection to unions from employers who
might attempt to disenfranchise them through corporate manipulations.
The theoretical underpinnings for successor employer provisions may
be explained in part by human capital literature. 8 This literature empha" Sec for example, Gary S. Becker, Hu111a11 Capital, 2d ed. (New York: National Bureau
of Economic Research, 1975).
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sizes the need to compensate employees for firm training that enhances
the employee's productivity only within the firm, hut docs not make the
employee more productive to other employers.') As both the employee
and the employer have invested in this form of firm training, a fair
contract is one where they share the costs and benefits, and in many
instances may account for a divergence between the employee's actual
wages and the wages that the employee could seek in the market. 10
Because the employer will generally have an informational advantage
in determining the firm-specific value of a worker's time, a role for
unions as monitors of the employment relationship exists. The union's
monitoring function is necessary because the employer has an incentive
to reduce wages whenever they exceed the wages that the employee
could seek in the market. 11
In situations where a trustee or a receiver runs a business for a
period of time they may have a greater incentive, as compared with the
original employer, to reduce wages so as to generate a surplus that can
be realized in the ultimate sale of the business or the assets. Given that
the trustee or receiver will he exiting the employment relationship in a
relatively short period of time, they will he less concerned about the
reputational impacts of opportunistic wage cutting. Further, the trustee
or receiver will have an information advantage regarding the circumstances of the debtor corporation. Accordingly, a mandatory successor
employer rule that can not he altered hy a bankruptcy court order appointing a receiver and that requires the trustee or receiver to honour the
debtor corporation's collective agreement is optimal.
At the same time, the importance of protecting employee rights
needs to he balanced against the central role that the trustee and/or the
receiver plays in the bankruptcy process. Practitioners have argued that
the danger with potential successor employer liability is that it will he
difficult to attract qualified professionals to serve as receivers or trustees,
and that where practitioners take on such appointments they will act too
cautiously. 12 In the context of a healthy, robust economy, the end of the
'' Ibid., at 26-37.
"' Ibid.
11
Keith H. Hylton & Maria O'Brien Hylton, '"Rent Appropriation and the Lahor Law
Doctrine of Successorship'' ( 1990) 70 B.U.L. Rev. 821 at 835-836 (Lexis).
12
Supra. n. 3 at paras. 55-56.
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20th century witnessed a similar concern about the personal liability that
was being placed on directors and officers, as well as gatekeepers such
as lawyers, underwriters, and most notably, auditors." The response to
the so-called liability crisis, which resulted in a reduction of professional
liability on many fronts, has assisted in creating an environment in which
many professionals have been lax about their conflicts of interest, have
succumbed to management pressure to approve financial documents in
a certain way, and overall have not performed their jobs of being independent scrutinizers of financial documents prepared hy management
adequately. 14 The outcome of a rhetoric that advocated limiting liability
had disastrous outcomes in the governance of healthy corporations that
should not he replicated in the context of financially troubled corporations.
Further, it should he noted that trustees and receivers can limit the
potential for successor employer liability in the bankruptcy context hy
seeking advance agreement from unions before making any key decisions. As Feldman J.A. noted in her reasons, it is in the unions' as well
as the other corporate stakeholders' interests to reach a compromise
given their mutual interest in the continuation of the business.

(b)

The Bankruptcy Court's Gatekeeping Function ands. 215 of
the BIA

The concern that receivers and trustees have with increased liability
to employees when they operate a debtor corporation's business has the
potential to be reduced by the bankruptcy court's supervisory role. This
role involves both helping unions work with receivers and/or trustees to
negotiate a compromise as to how employees will be treated, and rendering leave decisions under s. 21.5 of the BIA. That section provides
that, "except by leave of the court, no action lies against the Superintendent, an official receiver, an interim receiver or a trustee with respect to
any report made under, or any action taken pursuant to, this Act." Accordingly, the bankruptcy court is required lo exercise a gatekeeping
function and to screen any actions that third pa11ies may wish to take
1.i

14

Poonam Puri & Stephanie Ben-Ishai, "Proportionate Liability Under the CBCA in
the Context of Recent Corporate Governance Reform: Canadian Auditors in the
Wrong Place at the Wrong Time?" (2003) 39 Can. Bus. L.J. 36.
Ibid.
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against receivers and trustees, among others, and to grant leave in the
appropriate circumstances. The rationale behind s. 215 is that "single
control" is necessary in order for the bankruptcy court to address fairly
and orderly the interests of every effected party and to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.
(i)

Majority Reasons

In her analysis of s. 215, Feldman J.A. noted that the test for leave
has historically developed in the context of tort or fraud actions against
a trustee where the test for leave was a low one. In that context, all that
was required was a cause of action against the trustee and a factual
foundation that was not frivolous or vexatious. A demonstration that the
case could he made out was not required. In contrast, in the context of
unions seeking leave to proceed to the OLRB for successor employer
declarations, the actual substance of the leave test has not heen developed. This is because where the issue arose in the past, leave was not
granted on the basis that a collective agreement is a contract that terminates on bankruptcy. In rejecting this line of analysis, Feldman J.A.
held that a collective agreement is not terminated for all purposes in
bankruptcy and that the status of a collective agreement is governed by
the LRA and the OLRB.
While Feldman J.A. rejected the line of analysis that suggests that
a collective agreement terminates on bankruptcy, she did not adopt the
s. 215 test that has been developed in other contexts, and would have
suggested in this context that the bankruptcy court's sole role was to
determine whether there were facts that would allow the OLRB to declare the trustee or receiver a successor employer. Feldman J .A. held
that unlike the situation where an action is brought against a trustee or
a receiver for the ways in which their duties were carried out during a
bankruptcy, in the context of a successor employer issue, the outcome
of whether or not to grant leave is central to the bankruptcy or receivership as a whole. That is, the leave decision has implications for all
stakeholders, including employees that need to be balanced by the bankruptcy court in making this decision. Accordingly, Feldman J.A. held
that a bankruptcy court granting leave under s. 215 of the BIA must
consider the following factors:
[T]he timing of the application. the complexity of the receivership and the demands on the receiver as it carries out its obligations. the potential duration of the
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period that the receiver intends to operate the business hefore it can he sold
(normally as hrief as possible), the availability of potential purchasers and their
financial strength, and the likelihood that a purchaser will he declared a successor
employer and assume all of the obligations under the collective agreement. This
latter factor may he particularly important hecause it will give practical assurance
to the union that all the terms of the collective agreement will he honoured and
the employees protected. Another key factor is the practicality of proceedings
hefore the OLRB and the timeliness of a hearing hefore the tribunal in the context
of the proposed temporary operation of the business and its sale. Finally, the court
may consider the issue of immediate fairness to employees, including any arrangements that the receiver has made with the union to attempt to accommodate
its requirements during the period hefore the business is sold.

(ii)

Dissenting and Concurring Reasons

In dissent, MacPherson J.A. rejected Feldman J.A.'s test for granting leave to the OLRB for successor employer applications and instead
adopted the test as articulated by Osborne J.A. in Mancini (Trustee of)
v. Falconi 10 at 334:
I. Leave to sue a trustee should he not granted if the action is frivolous or
vexatious. Manifestly unmeritorious claims should not he permitted to proceed.
2. An action should not he allowed to proceed if the evidence filed in support of
the motion, including the intended action as pleased in draft form, does not
disclose a cause of action against the trustee. The evidence typically will he
presented hy way of affidavit and must supply facts to support the claim sought
to be asserted.
3. The court is not required to make final assessment of the merits of the claim
hefore granting leave.

In adopting the Mancini test, MacPherson J.A. noted that Feldman
J.A. was essentially allowing receivers and trustees to immunize themselves from the successor employer provisions by using s. 215 of the
BIA, despite asserting that appointment orders under s. 47(2) of the BIA
could not be used to do the same thing. MacPherson J.A. also expressed
concern that the hurdles for employees and unions seeking leave under
s. 215 appeared to be higher under the test articulated by Feldman J.A.
as compared with the test that had been applied to creditors in the past.
Cronk J.A. concurred with Feldman J.A.'s reasons and suggested that
in futures. 215 decisions, the higher standard for leave applications will
"

(1993), 1993 CarswellOnt 1861, (suh nom. Mancini (Bankrupl) v. Falconi) 61
0.A.C. 332 (Ont. C.A.).
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apply in situations not related to successor employer provisions, and
accordingly, will not present a higher hurdle for employees and unions
as is suggested by MacPherson J .A.
(iii)

Commentary

MacPherson J.A. raises a valid concern with respect to the different
standards that will apply to different stakeholders seeking leave under
s. 215 of the BIA. Feldman J.A. distinguishes between a situation such
as Mancini, where the issue was trustee wrongdoing, and a situation
where factors relating to the bankruptcy court's control over the bankruptcy process arise. It would have been helpful for Feldman J.A. to
have elaborated on a framework for distinguishing between the situations when the Mancini standard for leave will apply and the situations
when the newly formulated standard will apply outside of the successor
employer and OLRB contexts. Given that the Mancini test has been
applied to creditors in the past, the majority reasons do suggest a hierarchy between creditor stakeholders and other stakeholders, as MacPherson J.A. notes. However, given Feldman J.A.'s careful analysis
throughout the reasons in TCT of the multiple stakeholders who have
interests that must he balanced in bankruptcy, it does not appear that it
was her intent to create such a hierarchy. A statement in future jurisprudence to the effect that the nature of the s. 215 test turns on whether
granting leave will take away from the existence of a central controlling
forum and not on the identity of the stakeholder who brings such an
application would help to clarify this issue.
With respect to the second point of disagreement between the majority and the dissent, it is important to note the difference between the
role of the receiver and/or trustee and the bankruptcy court. In focusing
on this distinction, it becomes clear that Feldman J.A. was not using s.
215 to enable what she rejected under s. 47. Court-appointed receivers
and trustees play a central role in the effective implementation of bankruptcy law in Canada. As court-appointed officers they have an obligation to ensure that bankruptcy laws arc applied effectively and impartially. Gi vcn their access to detailed information surrounding the
corporation and its affairs, they arc also in the best position to make
informed decisions. However, receivers and trustees arc not a substitute
for the bankruptcy court.
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Due process in bankruptcy proceedings requires that a court of
competent jurisdiction adjudicate a dispute between a receiver or a
trustee and an interested party. Given that bankruptcy is a legal process,
there are important limits on how much the court's role can he diminished. The majority reasons in TCT limit the amount of authority without
liability that can be conferred on receivers and trustees by parties who
use s. 47(2) of the BIA to ask the bankruptcy court to "rubber-stamp"
private agreements that immunize them from liability to third parties.
At the same time, the majority reasons recognize that at times the careful
balancing act that is necessary to liquidate a corporation with the least
impact on third parties could be severely disrupted by a multiplicity of
proceedings related to the bankruptcy process in other forums. It is
within this context that Feldman J.A. has provided an orderly process
for ensuring that stakeholders, unions in this case, can he given an
opportunity to appear before a bankruptcy court if they feel that their
rights have not been adequately protected in the private decisions made
by the receiver or trustee, the debtor corporation, and major creditors in
the negotiation process. The s. 215 test articulated by the majority, with
a clarification that its application does not turn on the identity of the
stakeholder who brings the application, is well suited to the delicate
balancing act that takes place in the corporate bankruptcy context.

4.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeal's decision in TCThas disturbed the status quo
understanding of receiverships where private parties, irrespective of the
rights of third parties, can agree upon the terms and have them rubber
stamped ex parte by the bankruptcy court. Instead, the Court of Appeal
has given greater "teeth" to the bankruptcy court's gatckeeping function.
However, the s. 215 test articulated by Feldman J.A. will only be effective if the Canadian judiciary has sufficient capacity to implement it.
Given this renewed emphasis on the role of the judiciary in the
Canadian bankruptcy system, it will be important to develop a better
understanding of which members of the Canadian judiciary are handling
bankruptcy cases and how. In addition, TCT provides an opportunity to
give careful thought to the creation of social context education 16 specif'"

See Richard F. Devlin ... Jurisprudence for Judges: Why Legal Theory Matters for
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ically designed for bankruptcy judges. It is true, as Feldman J .A. notes
in her reasons, that qualities of a good bankruptcy judge include expertise, sensitivity and speed. However, equally important qualities for
bankruptcy judges include the ability to understand the impact of social,
economic, cultural, and political forces on the issues and corporate
stakeholders that appear before them. The diversity of these contexts is
often hidden from view when the same group of bankruptcy practitioners
and judges with shared socio-economic backgrounds, gender, and race,
repeatedly appear in Canadian bankruptcy courts. In addition to implementing some form of social context education, it will be impmtant to
encourage the development of a new generation of bankruptcy practitioners and members of the judiciary who arc able to contribute the
diverse perspectives and life experiences of employees and other stakeholders in the bankruptcy process, while at the same bringing the
necessary expertise and integrity to this legal process.

Social Context EJucation" (200 I) 27 Queen's L.J. 161, for a further Jiscussion of
this concept.

